Toward a Scotistic Modal Metaphysics :: Philosophy Philosophical Essays

Toward a Scotistic Modal MetaphysicsABSTRACT The problem I tackle in this essay is Do we have in Scotus a modal schema of logic or a counterpart theory? We need to take a rather roundabout path to handle this problem. This is because, whether it be in Lewiss schoolmaster formulation or in others applications, the crucial concept of counterpart has never been all the bearing explicated. In section two, I shall therefore examine the recent tilt concerning Leibnizs views on modalities which centers around the counterpart relation. By fully exploiting the lessons learned from such an examination, I shall then launch a trilemma against a Leibnizian in section three. Section four shall make the claim that unlike Leibnizs case, Scotuss property is not endangered by the trilemma. One important premise give be adopted from my thesis presented elsewhere regarding the different between Scotuss haecceitas and Leibnizs individualistic essence. Another will be secured from a brief repor t on Scotuss views on similarity, which might be utterly original to modern eye jaundiced by contemporary set theories.1. The Problem Scotistic Modal logic vs. Scotistic Counterpart TheoryThanks to the resurgence of interest in modalities in the twentieth century, the history of modal logic has been studied much extensively than ever. One of the more important lessons is that Scotus rather than Leibniz is the father of the modern construct of logical possibility. (1) Insofar as it is not merely historical admiration but a test of our intuition about modalities that we are arouse in the predecessors of modern modal logic, we face the urgent task of reconstructing the Scotistic system of modalities. In fact,Douglas C. Langston recently raised an interesting question as to which way of understanding possible worlds Scotus might endorse the counterpart view or the canonical view? Based on Ordinatio, Book I, d. 44, q. 1, n. 11, he presents two alternative instructions. Ultimately, h owever, he opts for the counterpart reading on the ground that it is more consistent with Scotuss remarks on how God knows contingents. An important consequence from the counterpart reading is that individuals are world-bound for Scotus. (2) Yet Langstons interpretation invites serious criticism. According to Simo Knuuttila, if the individuals in Scotuss work were world-bound, they would not have synchronic de re alternatives, which is not compatible with Scotuss remedy in obligational principles. Knuuttila further points out that Scotuss well-known doctrine of homosexual free will excludes the possibility of world-bound individuals.